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Abstract
We analyze a sequential decision making model in which decision makers (or, players) take
their decisions based on their own private information as well as the actions of previous decision
makers. Such decision making processes often lead to what is known as the information cas-
cade or herding phenomenon. Specifically, a cascade develops when it seems rational for some
players to abandon their own private information and imitate the actions of earlier players. The
risk, however, is that if the initial decisions were wrong, then the whole cascade will be wrong.
Nonetheless, information cascade are known to be fragile: there exists a sequence of revealing
probabilities {pℓ}ℓ≥1, such that if with probability pℓ player ℓ ignores the decisions of previous
players, and rely on his private information only, then wrong cascades can be avoided. Pre-
vious related papers which study the fragility of information cascades always assume that the
revealing probabilities are known to all players perfectly, which might be unrealistic in practice.
Accordingly, in this paper we study a mismatch model where players believe that the revealing
probabilities are {qℓ}ℓ∈N when they truly are {pℓ}ℓ∈N, and study the effect of this mismatch
on information cascades. We consider both adversarial and probabilistic sequential decision
making models, and derive closed-form expressions for the optimal learning rates at which the
error probability associated with a certain decision maker goes to zero. We prove several novel
phase transitions in the behaviour of the asymptotic learning rate.
1 Introduction
There are myriad economic and social scenarios where our decisions are influenced by the actions
of others. For example, voters are inclined to vote in favor of what opinion polls predicts will win.
Academic researchers choose to work on topics that are of broad and current interest. Fertility
decisions, e.g., how many children to have, are known to be influenced by what other people in
the same geographical location are doing. Opinions we hold, products we buy, and technologies
we use, etc., are all potentially affected by our surroundings. The above is a non-exhaustive list
of scenarios where our rational behaviour guides us to follow the actions of others despite the fact
that these may contradict our own information. This is exactly the situation where information
cascades [5, 7] develop.
To illustrate the way information cascades evolve we consider the following simple and classical
herding experiment, proposed and studied in [3, 2] (see also [9, Ch. 16]). In this experiment, we
place an urn that contains three marbles in front of a bunch of players. The urn contains either
one red marble and two blue marbles (majority blue), or, two red marbles and one blue marble
(majority red). Players do not know whether the urn is majority blue or red, while both urns are
∗W. Huleihel and O. Shayevitz are with the Department of Electrical Engineering-Systems at Tel-Aviv university,
Tel-Aviv 6997801, Israel (e-mail: {wasimh,ofersha@mail,eng}.tau.ac.il). This research was supported by the
European Research Council (ERC) under grant agreement 639573.
1
equally likely to be chosen. In a successive manner, each player randomly draws a single marble
from the urn, memorizes its color, and returns it to the urn, while not showing it to the other
players. Then, each player in his turn publicly announce his guess for the urn majority color. The
players guesses are based on both their own private draws as well as the actions/announcements of
previous players.
Next, we explain how the above experiment evolves. It is clear that the first two players will
announce their private signals as their guesses. Indeed, the first player gets to see his own draw
only, and thus his best guess for the urn majority color is the color he draw. The second player is
aware of that, and thus, together with his own draw he gets to see two independent draws from the
urn. Accordingly, if the colors agree, then the player announces this color; otherwise, there is a tie,
and in such a case let us assume that the player follows his own draw. Therefore, it is clear again
that the second player announces the color of the marble he draw. Continuing, the third player
now see three independent draws from the urn and consequently his best decision is the majority
color among these draws.
The most important observation here is that the rational guess of any subsequent player may not
reflect its own private information. For example, if the first two announced colors were blue, then
the third player guess is blue irrespectively of the color of the marble he picked. Evidently, due to
the fact that his guess will not reveal any information about the urn to any subsequent player, every
subsequent player will guess the urn to be majority blue. This is where an information cascade
developed: while no one is under the impression that every player draw a blue marble, since the first
two guesses were blue, future rational guesses must be blue as well. To wit, an information cascade
is a sequence of decisions where it is optimal for players to ignore their own private information and
imitate the decisions of players ahead of them. The problem with information cascade is that they
can be wrong ! Indeed, if for instance in the above example the urn is majority red, then everyone
wrongly announced blue as their guesses. In fact, in the above experiment, it can be shown that
with probability 1/5, a wrong cascade develops, in which case, most players will guess the urn
majority color wrongly.
The experiment above illustrates that information cascades can be wrong because they rely on
very little actual information–the actions of the first few players can determine the actions of all
future players. Nonetheless, this hints that information cascades can also be fundamentally very
fragile. Indeed, suppose that in the above experiment two consecutive players ℓ and ℓ+1 draw red
marbles, and they cheat (or, act irrationally) by announcing their marbles despite the fact that a
majority-blue cascade was already developed (say, the first two players announced blue). Then, it
is clear that the wrong cascade can be broken: player ℓ+ 2 sees four informative draws (two blues
and two reds), and he will announce his own private signal as his guess. The conclusion is that
infusion of new information can overturn/brake wrong information cascades even after they have
persisted for a long time.
Motivated by the above observation, we consider a simple sequential decision making model
in which not all players are rational, but rather certain players act irrationally, by revealing their
own private signal and discarding the actions of previous players. More specifically, we focus on a
recent model proposed by [17], where it is assumed that the ℓth player is irrational/revealer with
some probability pℓ, and is rational/Bayesian with complementary probability. While players do
not know whether other players before them were rational or not, it is assumed in [17] nonetheless
that players know the revealing probabilities {pℓ}ℓ∈N. As mentioned in [17], this model is prompted
by both empirical laboratory experiments [2, 14, 19], as well as several theoretical reasons [6]. One
of the intriguing questions here, is whether wrong information cascades are broken in the above
model? Or, stated differently, do people eventually learn the correct action? As was shown in
[17], the answer to this question is positive. Namely, it can be shown that there exists a sequence
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of revealing probabilities {pℓ}ℓ∈N such that learning occurs. In particular, the optimal policy
minimizing the probability of error is for the ℓth player to reveal its private signal with probability
pℓ = c/ℓ, which in turn implies a learning rate of c
′/ℓ, where c and c′ are explicit constants. While
these results are neat, as mentioned in [17] they rely heavily on the assumption that players are
fully coordinated, i.e., they know the revealing probabilities exactly, which might be unrealistic in
practice. This sets precisely the main goal of our paper: we aim to understand how this coordination
affects information cascades. To this end, we introduce a mismatch model where players believe
that the revealing probabilities are {qℓ}ℓ∈N when they truly are {pℓ}ℓ∈N. We are interested in
understanding whether asymptotic learning occur in this case? and if so, under what conditions
and at what learning rate? In particular, what is the cost of this mismatch?
The above mismatch model might be relevant in many real-world applications, such as, rumor
spreading over social networks, online movie rating, etc., where it is well-documented that human
behavior is sometimes irrational (e.g., [15]). Furthermore, it is well-known in the social learning
literature that a fully rational model often places unreasonable computational demands on Bayesian
players (e.g., [16]), hence understanding the impact of simpler more efficient strategies is desirable.
As we explain in the paper, this situation can be partially captured by our model, since our
mismatch framework allow for a family of sub-optimal strategies parameterized by the mismatch
sequence {qℓ}ℓ∈N.
Main Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are as follows. We start by formulat-
ing a general adversarial/worst-case model where the placement of irrational players is arbitrary,
and not being governed by any probabilistic/statistical rule. We show that this kind of model is in
fact too stringent leading to trivial results. Combined with [17], this fact motivates us to study the
more flexible probabilistic model described above. For this model we characterize the asymptotic
learning rate exactly, which turns out to exhibit several novel interesting phase transitions. Specif-
ically, we first show that for either too “optimistic” or “pessimistic” assumptions, i.e., qt = o(pt) or
qt = ω(pt), asymptotic learning does not occur, namely, the error probability is high, and the total
number of wrong decisions is significant. We then consider the case where qt = Θ(pt), and show
that asymptotic learning occurs, but at a reduced rate which loosely speaking depends on the ratio
between the ℓ1-norms of the matched and mismatched revealing probabilities. This is true, as long
as the magnitude of this ratio is moderate laying between two thresholds, otherwise, asymptotic
learning does not occur!
Related work. Sequential decision making has been studied in various areas including politics,
economics and computer science. In particular, the case where all players are Bayesian (i.e., pℓ =
0,∀ℓ) was considered in [9, 5, 7]. Notably, [7] gives many interesting real-world examples from
diverse fields, where information cascades develop and are fragile. Similarly to [17], our paper
provides a more detailed theoretical study of the fragility phenomenon. In practice, however, it
is well documented, that human behavior deviates from rationality, and rather irrational decisions
are made often, see, e.g., [15, 14] and [19]. Indeed, several laboratory experiments in [3] illustrate
that many individuals act irrationally, by ignoring the actions of other individuals and relying
mainly on their own private information. Our model captures this empirically observed behavioral
phenomenon.
In [6], a model which combines both rational and partially irrational (who put more weight on
their private signal) types of individuals, as in our model, was studied. It is assumed, however,
that players know which of the previous players were revealers. Using simulations it was suggested
that learning is achievable only when completely irrational individuals exist, and that their fraction
should vanish. These observations were rigorously proved in [17], showing that the optimal number
of revealers is logarithmic in the size of the group. Our results show that in many cases learning is
possible even if there is a mismatch. Recently, [8] also considered a model with irrational players,
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but assume that each agent knows which agents were revealers. While they show that asymptotic
learning occurs, the optimal learning rate was not characterized, which is another contribution of
our paper when there is a mismatch. Sequential decision models with unbounded private signals
(e.g., Gaussian) were studied in [18, 12]. We also mention the study of sequential decision making
models over social random graphs, e.g., [1, 4]. Finally, we mention another somewhat related
literature which studies the situation where agents take repeated decisions (rather than just a
single decision) based on their own private information and the actions of others, e.g., [13], and one
is interested in understanding whether all decision makers learn the correct state eventually, and if
so at what speed.
2 Problem Setup
In this section, we present our model and formulate the problem of interest. To convey neatly
the main ideas of this paper, we focus on a simple setting of the information cascade model.
Nonetheless, several generalizations listed at the end of this paper, can be derived using the same
techniques used in this paper. Let θ ∈ {1, 2} denote the state of the world, chosen uniformly at
random. At times t = 1, 2, 3, . . ., players one by one try to guess θ, relying on their own private
signals, as well as the global actions (guesses) of players who played before them.
We next describe the way private signals are formed. There is an urn that contains two types
of marbles: Type–I marbles are blue, and Type–II are red. There are two hypotheses depending
on the value of θ. Specifically, given θ, there are α marbles of type θ in the urn, and β marbles
of the other type, where we assume that α > β > 0. We conduct the following experiment: each
player draws a single marble from the urn and replace it. The color he draw is his private signal.
Thus, the private signals denoted by X1,X2, . . . are i.i.d., and:
P1(Xt = 1) =
α
α+ β
; P1(Xt = 2) =
β
α+ β
,
P2(Xt = 1) =
β
α+ β
; P2(Xt = 2) =
α
α+ β
,
where Pi(·) , P(·|θ = i), and t ∈ N. It is clear that the ratio α/β, rather than the actual values
of α and β, is important. We denote this ratio by γ , α/β. Note that an alternative equivalent
description of the above setting is that at each time t, the tth player private signal is Xt = θ with
some probability, and Xt = 3 − θ, with the complementary probability. With θ being latent, the
players goal is to guess the type of the marbles in the urn correctly. We denote by Zt the guess
of the tth player. As mentioned in the introduction, if all players act rationally by announcing
their majority decision, then with positive probability (wrong) information cascade will occur.
Accordingly, to break this wrong information cascade, we assume that each player, can operate in
either one of the following two modes:
• A revealer/irrational player, whose guess is simply its private signal, i.e., Zt = Xt.
• A Bayesian/rational player, whose guess is its best estimate given his private signal, previous
guesses by other players, and any additional auxiliary information.
Given the two modes above, it is left to specify the way players are “chosen” to be in either one of
the above modes, which is the last aspect of our model. We start with a general adversarial/worst-
case machinery, which turns out to be too stringent, and as a consequence leads to trivial results.
Nonetheless, this model will motivate our second probabilistic setting, which is the focus of this
paper.
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In the adversarial setting, we assume that out of a total of N ∈ N players VN ∈ N are irrational,
and are chosen in an arbitrary manner. We let ΠN be the set of these irrational players. Players
do not know whether previous players were rational or not, but they do have the value of VN in
advance. We define the probability of incorrect decision of the tth player, assuming that he is
rational, as follows,
Padv,t(VN) , inf
θˆt∈Θˆ
sup
ΠN⊂[N]: |ΠN|=VN
Pe,t(θˆt,ΠN), (1)
and
Pe,t(θˆt,ΠN) , P
[
θˆt(Z
t−1
1 ,Xt) 6= θ
∣∣∣RevN = ΠN] , (2)
where Zt−11 is a shorthand notation for the sequence (Z1, Z2, . . . , Zt−1), RevN designates the set of
revealers, the maximum is taken over all possible sets of revealers of size VN, and the minimum is
over the set of all possible estimators Θˆ, which are the Boolean maps {1, 2}t → {1, 2}. To wit, we
look at the worst-case error probability over all possible choices of VN irrational players out of N
players. An alternative objective is to minimize the expected total number of errors, that is,
TE(VN) , inf
θˆ∈Θˆ
sup
ΠN⊂[N]: |ΠN|=VN
N∑
t=1
Pe,t(θˆt,ΠN). (3)
For both objectives, it is a-priori unclear what is the optimal strategy θˆt. One option, which
is simple and widely used in practice, is to assume that each rational player guesses the value
of θ using the majority decision, denoted by Maj(Zt−11 ,Xt). A more complicated approach is to
minimize over the Boolean functions used by the rational players, i.e., to solve a minimax problem.
We would like to find the asymptotic behaviour of Padv,t(VN) and TE(VN), as a function of VN and
t. In particular, it is interesting to understand the structure of the worst-case choice of the set of
the irrational players ΠN. It turns out that the above model/objective, however, is too stringent.
Specifically, we show in Section 4.4 that the error probability in (1) associated with any estimator
is lower bounded by a constant, and accordingly, the total number of errors in (3) is proportional to
the number of players N. This implies that there are no guessing strategies that are robust against
an arbitrary adversarial revealers assignment. Therefore, a more flexible model is needed.
To this end, we consider the probabilistic setting introduced in [17]. Here, we assume that the tth
player is irrational with probability pt, independently of the other players. Accordingly, this means
that if player t is irrational, then Zt = Xt, while if he is rational, then Zt = θˆt(Z1, . . . , Zt−1,Xt),
where θˆ is a certain estimator for θ. The main important ingredient of our model is that we assume
that players are completely oblivious to whether previous players were revealers or not. To wit,
contrary to previous related works (e.g., [6, 8, 17]), we assume that revealers neither know the
exact positioning of revealers, nor the underlying probabilistic law of their placements. Instead,
players assume that other players can be revealers with probabilities Q ≡ {qt}
∞
t=1, which might be
different than the actual underlying probabilities P ≡ {pt}
∞
t=1. In that case, we say that there is
a mismatch. Thus, estimators θˆt might be in fact a function of Q as well. The matched case case
where P = Q was considered in [17].
Whenever a player is rational we assume that he tries to do his best in guessing θ under
the knowledge of Q. Namely, a rational player employs the (mismatched) maximum a posteriori
probability (MAP) estimator, which is simply the MAP estimator, but with P replaced by Q.
Specifically, for i ∈ {1, 2} and t ≥ 1, define the distributions:
W ti (z
t
1) , Pi
(
Zt1 = z
t
1
)
, (4)
Hti (z
t−1
1 , xt) , Pi
(
Zt−11 = z
t−1
1 ,Xt = xt
)
, (5)
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and the corresponding likelihood r.v.s by
Lti , W
t
i (Z
t
1), (6)
Dti , H
t
i (Z
t−1
1 ,Xt), (7)
with L0i = D
0
i = 1, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Note that player t can compute the likelihoods D
t
i, for i = 1, 2. The
likelihoods L0i = D
0
i = 1, for i ∈ {1, 2}, can be computed by a “genie” who observes the decisions of
the first t players. The above probabilities and likelihoods are certain quite complicated functions
of P. We let Wˆ ti and Hˆ
t
i be the corresponding probabilities with P replaced by Q. We also define
Lˆti and Dˆ
t
i in the same way, but with W
t
i and H
t
i replaced by Wˆ
t
i and Hˆ
t
i , respectively. With these
definitions, the mismatched MAP estimate, denoted by Zt = MAPQ(Zt−11 ,Xt), is:
MAPQ(Zt−11 ,Xt) ,


1, Dˆt1 > Dˆ
t
2,
2, Dˆt1 < Dˆ
t
2,
Xt, Dˆ
t
1 = Dˆ
t
2.
(8)
Thus, the mismatch aspect in our setup lies in the fact that the tth player estimator function depends
on Q, and more importantly, independent of P. We mention here that the above estimator in fact
provides a family of possible estimators indexed by Q. For instance, Q ≡ 1 corresponds to majority
decisions, for which rational players guesses are simply the majority color of their own private and
previously announced signals.
Players try to guess the urn majority color. We define the probability of incorrect guess by the
tth player, as follows,
Pe,t(P,Q) , P (Zt 6= θ) . (9)
Our goal is to understand the asymptotic learning rate at which the above error probability decays
to zero as a function of t (i.e., learning occurs). To motivate and define our objective precisely, we
recall the following recent result which deals with the matched case where P = Q.
Theorem 1. [17, Theorem 1.1] Let
κ(γ) ,
[
1 +
γ − 1
log γ
(
log
γ − 1
log γ
− 1
)]−1
. (10)
Then,
inf
P
lim sup
t→∞
t · Pe,t(P,P) = κ(γ). (11)
Moreover, one can be arbitrarily close to the optimum by taking,
p⋆t = (1 + ε) ·
(1 + γ)κ(γ)
t
∧ 1, (12)
for t ≥ 1 and arbitrary ǫ > 0.
Theorem 1 states that the optimal learning rate is Θ(1/t), and furthermore provides the exact
leading constant in (10). To achieve this optimal learning rate, the revealing probabilities should
also decay as Θ(1/t). The intuitive reasoning behind these findings can be found in [17, Sec. 1.2].
With this result in mind, in the mismatch case where Q 6= P, we focus on the following scenario.
We assume that P = P⋆, where P⋆ is defined in (12). In other words, the underlying revealing
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probabilities sequence is the optimal one, while players assume a (possibly) different sequence of
revealing probabilities Q. For simplicity of demonstration, we opted to focus on this special case
since we found it to be the most natural one. Nonetheless, our techniques apply also for the more
general case where P 6= P⋆, and at the end of the following section we cover with this case too.
It is then interesting to understand whether such a mismatch has any effect whatsoever on the
achieved learning rate. In particular, does asymptotic learning always occur? or, perhaps there is
a sequence of revealing probabilities Q for which learning is impossible. To answer these questions,
we aim to characterize the polynomial learning rate, defined as follows,
E(P,Q) , lim inf
t→∞ −
logPe,t(P,Q)
log t
. (13)
To lower bound E(P,Q) we upper bound the error probability Pe,t(P,Q), which in turn can be
used to upper bound the expected total number of errors:
TEt , E
[
t∑
ℓ=1
1 [Zℓ 6= θ]
]
. (14)
Accordingly, a positive polynomial decaying learning rate implies that TEt = o(t), i.e., the number
of errors is negligible compared to the total number of players participated thus far. It is clear
that Theorem 1 implies that E(P⋆,P⋆) = 1, and in fact that 0 ≤ E(P⋆,Q) ≤ 1, for any Q. We
would like to understand when it is possible or impossible to obtain a positive polynomial decaying
learning rate, i.e., when E(P⋆,Q) > 0. Note that an interesting question is to characterize the
specific constant in front of the polynomial decaying term by evaluating limt→∞ tE(P,Q) ·Pe,t(P,Q),
which we leave as an open question for future research. Finally, note that Theorem 1 gives a simple
lower bound on Pe,t(P
⋆,Q) because of the trivial inequality Pe,t(P
⋆,Q) ≥ Pe,t(P
⋆,P⋆). Indeed, for
each player seeking to minimize the error probability, its best action is to output the (matched)
MAP decision. It is interesting to note that this observation also follows from
Pe,t(P
⋆,Q) ≥
β
α+ β
· p⋆t =
κ(γ)
t
, (15)
for t large enough, and the first inequality follows because βα+βp
⋆
t is the error probability when
player t acts on its private information only (i.e., revealer), while we ignore the error resulted when
player t is rational. This lower bound, however, is not tight as we show in the following section.
For the rest of this paper, we let Pt , (p1, p2, . . . , pt), and ‖·‖ denotes the ℓ1-norm.
3 Main Results
In this section, we study the probabilistic setting described in the previous section. According
to Theorem 1, to achieve the optimal learning rate the revealing probabilities should decay as
Θ(t−1). Note that it is clear that the revealing probabilities cannot decay to zero too quickly.
Indeed, if for example ‖P‖ < ∞, then by the Borel-Cantelli lemma there will be only a finite
number of revealers almost surely, which is equivalent to the situation where no revealers exist.
This in turn implies a non-vanishing error probability. The situation is somewhat similar when the
revealing probabilities decay to zero too slowly. Intuitively, in this case, it can be shown that the
error probability is dominated by the probability that the tth player is a revealer and announce a
wrong decision, namely, βα+βpt. Therefore, if for example pt = Θ(t
−c), for some c ∈ (0, 1), then
E(P,P) = c < E(P⋆,P⋆).
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The optimal scaling of the revealing probabilities suggests that with high probability there
should be ‖Pt‖ ∼ log t revealers, as t→∞. Accordingly, in terms of mismatch, it makes sense that
“wise” players will assume that the revealing probabilities decay at the same order, but perhaps
with a different constant in front, e.g., qt = ρ · pt, and ρ 6= 1. Nonetheless, as mentioned above,
rather than modeling the imperfect knowledge of players about the revealing probabilities, our
mismatched MAP can also model the situation where players intentionally employ sub-optimal
strategies (e.g., in order to reduce computational complexity), such as when Q ≡ 1, which results
in majority decisions. While it is clear from the above that in the matched case it is strictly worse
to assume that the revealing probabilities P decay to zero too quickly/slowly, it is a-priori unclear
if this is true for Q as well. The following result shows that if the assumed revealing probabilities
Q are either too small or too large, then asymptotic learning does not occur at all! In particular,
E(P⋆,Q) = 0. We have the following result.
Theorem 2 (Too quick/slow). For any sequence of mismatched revealing probabilities Q such that,
lim inf
t→∞
‖Qt‖
log t
= 0 or lim sup
t→∞
‖Qt‖
log t
=∞, (16)
we have E(P⋆,Q) = 0.
Theorem 2 implies, for example, that if qt = o(t
−1) or qt = ω(t−1), then the error probability
cannot decay to zero polynomially fast. In fact, our proof gives a general lower bound on the
probability of error which implies for instance that when ‖Q‖ <∞, then the probability of error is
lower bounded by a constant. Indeed, as will be seen in the proofs, to analyze the error probability
one needs to track the dynamics of the likelihood ratio Rt ,
Lt1
Lt2
. In particular, Rt < β/α (Rt > α/β)
implies that the tth player MAP decision is “2” (“1”). Accordingly, given that θ = 1, the main
observation in the proof of Theorem 2, is based on the realization that when ‖Qt‖ = O(1), even in
the worst-case scenario where the majority of the decisions before player t were θˆi = 1, only a finite
number of wrong decisions (namely, θˆi = 2) suffice to mislead player t and output θˆt = 2. This
happens to be the case because of the fact that the likelihood ratio depends on Q only through
‖Q‖, and therefore, it cannot diverge. The intuitive explanation for the obtained result when
‖Qt‖ ≫ log t is given after Theorem 3.
We next consider the more interesting case where qt = ρ · pt, for t ∈ N and ρ ∈ R+, or, more
generally, ‖Qt‖ / ‖P
⋆
t ‖ → ρ, as t→∞. To present our main result we establish first some notation.
Let
ρ0 ,
log γ
γ − 1
, (17)
and ρ1 , γ · ρ0. Also, define
δ(γ, ρ) ,
γ log γ − ρ(γ − 1)
[
1 + log γ log γρ(γ−1)
]
(1 + γ) log γ
. (18)
Theorem 3 (Multiplicative mismatch). For any sequence of mismatched revealing probabilities Q
such that,
lim sup
t→∞
‖Qt‖
‖P⋆t ‖
= ρ ∈ R+, (19)
we have:
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Figure 1: The learning rate E(P⋆,Q) in Theorem 3 as a function of ρ, for different values of γ. The maximal
learning rate is achieved at ρ = 1 for any γ, as expected. Also, as γ increases the range of ρ’s for which the
learning rate is positive increases.
• If ρ ≤ ρ0 or ρ ≥ ρ1,
E(P⋆,Q) = 0.
• If ρ0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1,
E(P⋆,Q) = (1 + γ)
[
δ(γ, ρ) −
γ − 1
γ + 1
(1− ρ)
]
κ(γ).
• If 1 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ1,
E(P⋆,Q) = (1 + γ)δ(γ, ρ)κ(γ).
It can be checked that E(P⋆,Q) is continuous in (ρ, γ). Theorem 3 suggests a clear phase
transition in the behaviour of the learning rate (see Fig. 1 for a numerical illustration). To wit,
even when players assume that the revealing probabilities decay at the same order of the optimal
revealing assignments, albeit with a different constant, there are regimes where the learning rate is
zero (i.e., when ρ ≤ ρ0 and ρ ≥ ρ1). We next give a heuristic explanation as to why the learning
rate is zero in these regimes. We start with the case where ρ ≥ ρ1. First, note that there are
two main sources for wrong action: 1) the tth player is irrational, which happens with probability
p⋆t , and his draw is of minority color type, or, 2) the t
th player is rational, which happens with
probability 1 − p⋆t , but his mismatched MAP estimate is wrong. Therefore, it is clear that the
error probability can be lower bounded by Pe,t(P
⋆,Q) ≥ (1 − p⋆t ) · P1
(
MAPQ(Zt−11 ,Xt) = 2
)
. We
show in the proof that the MAP error probability can be further lower bounded by the probability
that the likelihood ratio Rt−1 , Lt−11 /L
t−1
2 , at time t − 1, is less than β/α, namely, we have
Pe,t(P
⋆,Q) ≥ (1 − p⋆t ) · P1 (Rt−1 < β/α). To further lower bound the probability term on the
r.h.s. of the above inequality, we construct a particular trajectory that ensures that the likelihood
ratio Rt−1 stays always below the threshold β/α. The main observation is then that when the
likelihood ratio is bellow β/α, the corresponding log-likelihood ratio process logRt as a function of
t, performs a random walk with a downward drift when ρ ≥ ρ1, and thus intuitively the probability
that the likelihood ratio will stay bellow some fixed value is high. Technically speaking, we show
that this random walk is a supermartingale, and by using well-known tail probability bounds for
such processes, we show that P1 (Rt−1 < β/α) can not decay too fast. Establishing this result,
9
and proving a certain monotonicity property of the error probability w.r.t. Q, we show that
E(P⋆,Q) = 0 when ‖Qt‖ ≫ log t as well, as claimed in Theorem 2. On other hand, when ρ < ρ1,
the previously mentioned random walk has an upward drift, and thus, the probability that this
walk stays always bellow β/α is intuitively small, and in fact, decays at the polynomial rate given
in Theorem 3.
The reason for the learning rate being zero for ρ ≤ ρ0 is similar. Contrary to the case where
ρ ≥ ρ1, in this regime, it can be shown that bellow log(β/α) the log-likelihood ratio process performs
a random walk with an upward drift, and thus the approach used before for lower bounding the error
probability is not going to work. It turns out, however, that above log(α/β), the log-likelihood ratio
process has a downward drift. Moreover, we can show that in this case the walk cannot diverge,
or, more precisely, go beyond a certain finite value. Among other things, this implies that it takes
only a finite number of timestamps to drive the log-likelihood ratio bellow log(β/α), which in turn
entails that the error probability is finite as well. Specifically, to lower bound the error probability,
we show that it is suffice to look at all trajectories for which the private signals of the last t⋆ ∈ N
revealers are opposite to the majority (e.g., Xi = 2, for if θ = 1). Indeed, this way we can assure
that the likelihood ratio decreases by a multiplicative factor of β/α. Accordingly, since we argue
that the maximal value that likelihood ratio can attain is finite, it is clear that there exists a finite
value of t⋆ which will drive Rt bellow β/α (note that t
⋆ revealers decrease the likelihood by an
exponential factor of (β/α)t
⋆
). Finally, when ρ0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, the random walk has now an upward
drift, and thus, the probability that it will go bellow β/α is small, and in fact, decaying at the
polynomial rate given in Theorem 3.
The above results characterize E(P⋆,Q). As mentioned in the previous section, the same tech-
niques exactly can be used to derive the learning rate E(P,Q) for any P, and we present our main
findings bellow. Proof sketches can be found in Section 4.3. First, as was mentioned at the begin-
ning of this section whenever P is such that ‖P‖ <∞, then Borel-Cantelli lemma implies that there
will be only a finite number of revealers almost surely, which is equivalent to the situation where
no revealers exist. This in turn implies a non-vanishing trivial error probability, and asymptotic
learning does not occur. In fact, if ‖Pt‖ = o(log t), then E(P,Q) = 0, as we show in Section 4.3.
Theorem 4. For any sequence of revealing probabilities P such that ‖Pt‖ = o(log t), and any
sequence of mismatched revealing probabilities Q, it holds that E(P,Q) = 0.
Next, we consider the case where ‖Pt‖ / log t → Cp, as t → ∞, which happens to be the case,
for example, when pt = Cp/t ∧ 1, for some Cp ∈ R+. Recall the definitions of ρ0, ρ1, and δ(γ, ρ) in
(17)–(18). We have the following result.
Theorem 5. For any sequence of revealing probabilities P such that ‖Pt‖ / log t → Cp, for some
Cp ∈ R+, and mismatched revealing probabilities Q such that,
lim sup
t→∞
‖Qt‖
‖Pt‖
= ρ ∈ R+, (20)
we have:
• If ρ ≤ ρ0 or ρ ≥ ρ1, then
E(P,Q) = 0.
• If ρ0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1,
E(P,Q) = 1 ∧
[
Cp ·
(
δ(γ, ρ) −
γ − 1
γ + 1
(1− ρ)
)]
.
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Figure 2: The learning rate E(P ,Q) in Theorem 5 as a function of ρ, for different values of Cp, and γ = 10.
• If 1 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ1, then
E(P,Q) = 1 ∧ [Cp · δ(γ, ρ)] .
From Theorem 5 it can be seen that conceptually the learning rate behaves similarly to the
learning rate when P = P⋆. In particular, the learning exhibits the same phase transitions as in
Theorem 3. Fig. 2 presents a numerical calculation of the rate in Theorem 5, for several values of Cp.
Note that for ρ = 1, when Cp < (1+γ)κ(γ), we get that E(P,Q) < 1, while, for any Cp ≥ (1+γ)κ(γ),
we get that E(P,Q) = 1. This might seem counterintuitive because Theorem 1 claims that Cp =
(1+γ)κ(γ) is the optimal value minimizing the error probability, while the above suggests that any
value Cp ≥ (1 + γ)κ(γ) suffices. Note, however, that while indeed any value Cp ≥ (1 + γ)κ(γ) gives
a unit polynomial learning rate, the choice of Cp = (1 + γ)κ(γ) minimizes the leading coefficient
in front of the decaying term, namely, lim supt→∞ t · Pe,t(P⋆,P⋆) < lim supt→∞ t · Pe,t(P,P), for
any P with Cp > (1 + γ)κ(γ). This explains also why E(P,Q) in Theorem 5 is increasing as a
function of Cp. Specifically, it is seen that when Cp > (1 + γ)κ(γ), there are values of ρ for which
E(P⋆, ρ · P⋆) < E(P, ρ · P). Indeed, in case of mismatch, taking P⋆ to be the underlying revealing
probabilities might be sub-optimal, and choosing a different set of probabilities which combat the
mismatch results in a higher rate. Finally, we consider the case where ‖Pt‖ = ω(log t), for which
we have the following result.
Theorem 6. Let P be such that ‖Pt‖ / log t → ∞. If the mismatched revealing probabilities Q is
such that,
lim sup
t→∞
‖Qt‖
‖Pt‖
= ρ ∈ R+, (21)
with ρ ≤ ρ0 or ρ ≥ ρ1, or
lim inf
t→∞
‖Qt‖
‖Pt‖
= 0 or lim sup
t→∞
‖Qt‖
‖Pt‖
=∞,
then E(P,Q) = 0. Otherwise, if ρ0 < ρ < ρ1, then
E(P,Q) = lim
t→∞−
log pt
log t
.
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Theorem 6 states that if the number of revealers is significantly bigger than log t, then the
error probability is dominated by the probability that the tth player is a revealer and announce
a wrong decision, namely, βα+βpt. Therefore, if for example pt = Θ(t
−c), for some c ∈ (0, 1),
then E(P,Q) = c, as long as the mismatch is not too “severe”, namely, ‖Qt‖ / ‖Pt‖ → ρ, and
ρ0 < ρ < ρ1. Otherwise, learning does not occur and E(P,Q) = 0.
4 Proof of Main Results
4.1 Proof of Theorem 2
We start with the case where lim inft→∞
‖Qt‖
log t = 0. To lower bound the error probability we need to
understand first how the mismatched MAP decisions evolve over time/players. We next establish
some notation, which will simplify the analysis. For i ∈ {1, 2} and t ≥ 1, recall our notation in
(4)–(8). Also, for x ∈ {1, 2}, let
φi(x) ,
α
α+ β
1 [x = i] +
β
α+ β
1 [x 6= i] . (22)
Note that Dˆti = Lˆ
t−1
i φi(Xt). Finally, we define
Rt ,
Lˆt1
Lˆt2
, R′t ,
Dˆt1
Dˆt2
. (23)
It is clear that
R′t = Rt−1
φ1(Xt)
φ2(Xt)
. (24)
Since the ratio φ1(Xt)/φ2(Xt) can take values in {β/α, α/β}, we have three possible cases only:
• If Rt−1 < β/α then, clearly R′t < 1, irrespective of the value of Xt. Thus, Zt = 1 only if player
t is irrational and Xt = 1. Otherwise, Zt = 2.
• If Rt−1 ∈ [β/α, α/β] then it can be easily shown that Zt = Xt.
• If Rt−1 > α/β then, clearly R′t > 1, irrespective of the value of Xt. Thus, Zt = 2 only if player
t is irrational and Xt = 2. Otherwise, Zt = 1.
Let {Ft}t≥0 denote the filtration spanned by {Zt}t≥1. Let Pˆ1(Zt = i|Ft−1) be the probability that
the guess by player t is i, given the history and θ = 1, and the evaluation of this probability is with
respect to the mismatched revealers probabilities Q. Then, based on the above, we have
Pˆ1(Zt = 1|Ft−1) =


α
α+β qt, if Rt−1 < β/α,
α
α+β , if Rt−1 ∈ [β/α, α/β],
1− βα+β qt, if Rt−1 > α/β,
(25)
and
Pˆ2(Zt = 1|Ft−1) =


β
α+β qt, if Rt−1 < β/α,
β
α+β , if Rt−1 ∈ [β/α, α/β],
1− αα+β qt, if Rt−1 > α/β.
(26)
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There are two main sources for wrong action: 1) the tth player is irrational, which happens with
probability pt, and his draw is of minority color type, or, 2) the t
th player is rational, but his
mismatched MAP estimate is wrong. Accordingly, we can write
Pe,t(P
⋆,Q) = P
(
MAPQ(Zt−11 ,Xt) 6= θ
)
· (1− p⋆t ) + P(Xt 6= θ) · p
⋆
t
≥ P
(
MAPQ(Zt−11 ,Xt) 6= θ
)
· (1− p⋆t )
= P1
(
MAPQ(Zt−11 ,Xt) = 2
)
· (1− p⋆t ), (27)
where the last equality follows by symmetry. We next lower bound the probability term at the
r.h.s. of (27). To this end, we define an event that implies that the output of the mismatched MAP
is 2, given that θ = 1. Let t¯1, t¯2 ≤ t
⋆ be three natural numbers, to be defined in the sequel. Let
rev(t⋆) , {i1, i2, . . . , it⋆} be the set of the last t
⋆ revealers. Define the following event
E(t¯1, t¯2, t
⋆) ,
{
Xi = 2,∀i ∈ rev(t
⋆) ∪
{
it¯1 , it¯1 + 1 . . . , it¯1 + t¯2
}}
, (28)
namely, it is the event that the last t⋆ revealers are such that their private signal is “2”, and all
consecutive players it¯1 , it¯1 +1, . . . , it¯1 + t¯2 (either revealers or rationals) are such that their private
signal is “2” as well. We claim that by carefully choosing the values of t¯1, t¯2, and t
⋆, we can show
that E(t¯1, t¯2, t
⋆) implies that the tth player (mismatched MAP) guess is “2”. To this end, note that
the first two individuals follow their private signals, that is Z1 = X1 and Z2 = X2. Therefore, if
X1 = X2 = 1, then R2 = (α/β)
2, otherwise, R2 = (β/α)
2. Depending on either one of the above
situations, the proceeding guesses depend on whether a student is a revealer or not, and value of
the likelihood Rt at each step t. Accordingly, at step i1 − 1, the worst-case (largest) attainable
value of the likelihood ratio is
Ri1−1 =
(
α
β
)2
·
i1−1∏
i=3
1− βα−β qi
1− αα−β qi
(29)
≤
(
α
β
)2
e
α−β
α+β
∑i1−1
i=3 qi , (30)
which corresponds to the situation where X1 = X2 = 1, and the proceeding players decisions up to
t ≤ i1−1 are Zt = 1. Now, over E(t¯1, t¯2, t
⋆), we know that the i1 player is a revealer and its private
information is Xi1 = 2. Since he is a revealer its decision will be Zi1 = 2, which implies that the
likelihood ratio is
Ri1 =
(
α
β
)
·
i1−1∏
i=3
1− βα−β qi
1− αα−β qi
. (31)
The index of the next revealer is i2. Thus, since Ri1 > α/β, the decisions of the proceeding players
up to player i2, are “1”, which imply that
Ri2−1 =
(
α
β
)
·
i2−1∏
i=3
1− βα−β qi
1− αα−β qi
. (32)
Then, since i2 is a revealer and its private information is Xi2 = 2, we have
Ri2 =
i1−1∏
i=3
1− βα−β qi
1− αα−β qi
, (33)
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and the above process continues. In particular, assuming that Rij−1 > α/β, the likelihood ratio
after the ij
th decision is
Rij =
(
β
α
)j−2 ij−1∏
i=3
1− βα−β qi
1− αα−β qi
. (34)
We denote by t¯1 the index at which the likelihood ratio Rit¯1 , after the it¯1
th decision, is in the
interval [β/α, α/β]. Indeed, when this happens, according to (25)–(26), the likelihood ratio Rit¯1
will be multiplied by either β/α or α/β depending on whether the private information is “2” or “1”,
respectively, until the likelihood ratio value will be either below β/α or above α/β. Accordingly,
over E(t¯1, t¯2, t
⋆), we force the private information of players it¯1 , it¯1 + 1, . . . , it¯1 + t¯2 to be “2”, so
that the corresponding likelihoods will be multiplied by β/α, until the likelihood ratio value will
get bellow β/α, and accordingly, t¯2 is chosen such that
Rt¯1+t¯2 =
(
β
α
)t¯1+t¯2−2 it¯−1∏
i=3
1− βα−β qi
1− αα−β qi
, (35)
will be less than β/α. Next, due to the fact that over E(t¯1, t¯2, t
⋆) the leftover revealers are such
that their private information is “2”, and the likelihood ratio is below β/α (and so MAP outputs
“2”), it is clear that all the leftover players decisions will be “2”. To assure that we take enough
revealers at the end, we chose t⋆ such that,
(
β
α
)t⋆−2 t−t∗∏
i=3
1− βα−β qi
1− αα−β qi
<
β
α
, (36)
which reflects the case where the players decision are always “1” up to time t − t⋆, and then the
left over t⋆ players are all revealers with “2” being their private information. It is evident that (36)
holds if
t⋆ ≥ 3 +
α− β
α+ β
·
‖Qt‖
log(α/β)
. (37)
Note that when ‖Qt‖ is a finite number which happens to be the case when qt = o(t
−1) (as opposed
to ‖P⋆t ‖ which grows logarithmically with t), implies that t
⋆ is finite, which in turn is the reason
for the fact that the error probability is finite. Also, by the same token, it is clear that t¯1 and t¯2
are finite too, with t¯2 < t
⋆. The latter implies that E(t¯1, t
⋆, t⋆) ⊆ E(t¯1, t¯2, t
⋆). Finally, we need to
make sure that the size of the set of all revealers, denoted by Revt , {i ∈ [t] : player i is revealer}
is bigger than t⋆ with high probability. Let Mt ,
∑t
i=1 pi ∼ log t. Then, by Chernoff’s bound
P (|Revt| ≤ t
⋆) ≤ exp(t⋆ log Mtt⋆ −Mt + t
⋆) = O(t−1) ≤ 1/2. Thus, we get that
P1
(
MAPQ(Zt−11 ,Xt) = 2
)
≥ P1 [E(t¯1, t¯2, t
⋆)] ≥
∑
A:|A|>t⋆
P (Revt = A)P1 [E(t¯1, t¯2, t
⋆)|Revt = A]
≥
∑
A:|A|>t⋆
P (Revt = A)P1 [E(t¯1, t
⋆, t⋆)|Revt = A]
≥
(
β
α+ β
)2t⋆
· P (|Revt| > t
⋆)
≥
1
2
(
β
α+ β
)2t⋆
. (38)
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Therefore, using (27), (38), and the fact that lim inft→∞
‖Qt‖
log t = 0 we get
E(P⋆,Q) = lim inf
t→∞ −
logPe,t(P
⋆,Q)
log t
(39)
≤ 2 log
(
α+ β
β
)
· lim inf
t→∞
t⋆
log t
= 0. (40)
Since it is clear that E(P⋆,Q) ≥ 0 we may conclude that in this regime E(P⋆,Q) = 0. Finally,
proving that E(P⋆,Q) = 0 for the case lim inft→∞
‖Qt‖
log t = ∞ follows from Theorem 3 (specifically,
using the fact that for ρ > ρ1 we have E(P
⋆,Q) = 0), and a monotonicity property of the error
probability w.r.t. the revealing probabilities Q. We provide the complete details in Section 4.2.2.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 3
We split the proofs into several upper and lower bounds, which together characterize tightly the
asymptotic learning rate. Note that by “lower bounds” (“upper bounds”) we mean lower- (upper-)
bounding the learning rate by upper- (lower-) bounding the error probability.
4.2.1 Lower Bound: ρ0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ1
We analyze next the probability of wrong action by the tth player. Accordingly, there are two main
sources for wrong action: 1) the tth player is irrational, which happens with probability pt, and his
draw is of minority color type, or, 2) the tth player is rational, but his mismatched MAP estimate
is wrong. Accordingly, we can write
Pe,t(P,Q) = P
(
MAPQ(Zt−11 ,Xt) 6= θ
)
· (1− pt) + P(Xt 6= θ) · pt (41)
= P
(
MAPQ(Zt−11 ,Xt) 6= θ
)
· (1− pt) +
β
α+ β
· pt. (42)
Therefore, to upper bound Pe,t(P,Q) we need to upper bound the probability that the mismatched
MAP estimator is incorrect. To this end, we next establish some notation, which will simplify
the analysis. For i ∈ {1, 2} and t ≥ 1, recall our notations in (4)–(8), as well as the definitions
in (22)–(24). Finally, recall that depending on the value that Rt−1 takes, there are three modes
of operation for the MAP estimator (see, the paragraph following (24)). In particular, the error
probability associated with the MAP estimator can be upper bounded as follows,
P
(
MAPQ(Zt−11 ,Xt) 6= θ
)
= P1
(
MAPQ(Zt−11 ,Xt) 6= 1
)
= P1
(
R′t ≤ 1
)
≤ P1
(
Rt−1 ≤
α
β
)
. (43)
Thus, it is suffice to upper bound P1 (Rt−1 ≤ α/β). To this end, we use similar techniques used in
[17, Sec. 2.2], but with modifications which handle the mismatch aspect of our model. Let {Ft}t≥0
denote the filtration spanned by {Zt}t≥1. Then, for λ ∈ [0, 1], we have
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ∣∣∣∣∣Ft−1
]
= E1

( Pˆ1(Zt|Ft−1)
Pˆ2(Zt|Ft−1)
)−λ∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft−1

 (44)
=
∑
i∈{1,2}
P1(Zt = i|Ft−1)
(
Pˆ1(Zt = i|Ft−1)
Pˆ2(Zt = i|Ft−1)
)−λ
, (45)
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where P1(Zt = i|Ft−1) is the probability that player t guess is i given the history and θ = 1, and the
evaluation of this probability is with respect to the underlying true revealers probabilities P. On the
other hand, Pˆ1(Zt = i|Ft−1) is the probability that player t guess is i given the history and θ = 1,
and the evaluation of this probability is with respect to the mismatched revealers probabilities Q.
Accordingly, the values of these probabilities are given in (25)–(26), and
P1(Zt = 1|Ft−1) =


α
α+βpt, if Rt−1 < β/α,
α
α+β , if Rt−1 ∈ [β/α, α/β],
1− βα+β pt, if Rt−1 > α/β.
(46)
Therefore, we have,
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ∣∣∣∣∣Ft−1,Rt−1 < βα
]
=
α1−λβλ
α+ β
pt +
(
1−
α
α+ β
pt
)[
1− βα+β qt
1− αα+β qt
]λ
, (47)
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ∣∣∣∣∣Ft−1,Rt−1 ∈
[
β
α
,
α
β
]]
=
α1−λβλ + αλβ1−λ
α+ β
, (48)
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ∣∣∣∣∣Ft−1,Rt−1 > αβ
]
=
αλβ1−λ
α+ β
pt +
(
1−
β
α+ β
pt
)[
1− αα+β qt
1− βα+β qt
]λ
. (49)
Since we assume that both pt and qt decay with t, we use the fact that (1− δ)
λ = 1− λ · δ+Θ(δ2),
as δ → 0. Let
fλ ≡ fλ(α, β) ,
α− α1−λβλ
α+ β
, (50)
gλ ≡ gλ(α, β) ,
(α− β)λ
α+ β
, (51)
hλ ≡ hλ(α, β) ,
β − αλβ1−λ
α+ β
. (52)
Then, we have
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ∣∣∣∣∣Ft−1,Rt−1 < βα
]
= 1− fλ · pt + gλ · qt +O(p
2
t + q
2
t ), (53)
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ∣∣∣∣∣Ft−1,Rt−1 ∈
[
β
α
,
α
β
]]
=
α1−λβλ + αλβ1−λ
α+ β
, (54)
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ∣∣∣∣∣Ft−1,Rt−1 > αβ
]
= 1− hλ · pt − gλ · qt +O(p
2
t + q
2
t ). (55)
Define the following two sets:
At ,
{
i ∈ [t] : Ri−1 >
α
β
}
, (56)
and Bt , A
c
t = [t] \ At. Define also,
R
(1)
t ,
∏
i∈At
Ri
Ri−1
(57)
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and
R
(2)
t ,
∏
i∈Bt
Ri
Ri−1
. (58)
Note that Rt = R
(1)
t · R
(2)
t . We these definitions, using (53)–(55), we note that there exist some
constants C and C ′ independent of λ, such that for all λ,
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ
ehλpt+gλqt
∣∣∣∣∣Rt−1, t ∈ At
]
≤ eC
′(p2t+q
2
t ), (59)
and
E1
[(
Rt
Rt−1
)−λ
efλpt−gλqt
∣∣∣∣∣Rt−1, t ∈ Bt
]
≤ eC(p
2
t+q
2
t ). (60)
Recall that ‖Pt‖ =
∑t
i=1 pi and ‖Qt‖ =
∑t
i=1 qi. Also, let Γ
p
t ,
∑t
i∈At pi and Γ
q
t ,
∑t
i∈At qi. By
induction, we can easily see that there exists a constant C such that for any λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1],
E1
[(
R
(1)
t
)−λ1
ehλ1Γ
p
t+gλ1Γ
q
t
(
R
(2)
t
)−λ2
efλ2 (‖Pt‖−Γ
p
t )−gλ2 (‖Qt‖−Γ
q
t )
]
≤ eC
∑t
i=1(p
2
i+q
2
i ), (61)
and since
∑t
i=1(p
2
i + q
2
i ) is finite, we can upper bound the r.h.s. of (61) by a constant C0. Now, as
was shown in [17, Appendix A], the condition Rt ≤
α
β implies that R
(1)
t ≤ 1. Thus, we may write
P1
(
Rt ≤
α
β
)
≤ P1
(
Rt ≤
α
β
, t−C1 ≤ R(1)t ≤ 1
)
+ P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ t
−C1
)
. (62)
A simple application of multiplicative Chrenoff’s bound shows that the second term on the r.h.s.
of the above inequality is upper bounded by t−2, for some constant C1 <∞. We next upper bound
the first term on the r.h.s. of the above inequality. Since Rt = R
(1)
t · R
(2)
t , we can write
P1
(
Rt ≤
α
β
, t−C1 ≤ R(1)t ≤ 1
)
≤
C1 log t∑
x=0
P1
(
R
(1)
t ∈
[
e−(x+1), e−x
]
,R
(2)
t ≤ e
x+C3
)
(63)
≤
C1 log t∑
x=0
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ e
−x,R(2)t ≤ e
x+C3
)
, (64)
where C3 , 1 + log
α
β . Then, for any λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1], we have
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ e
−x,R(2)t ≤ e
x+C3
)
= P1
[(
R
(1)
t
)−λ1
≥ eλ1x,
(
R
(2)
t
)−λ2
≥ e−λ2(x+C3)
]
, (65)
and then,
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ e
−x,R(2)t ≤ e
x+C3
)
= P1
[(
R
(1)
t
)−λ1
ehλ1Γ
p
t+gλ1Γ
q
t ≥ eλ1x+hλ1Γ
p
t+gλ1Γ
q
t ,
(
R
(2)
t
)−λ2
efλ2 (‖Pt‖−Γ
p
t )−gλ2 (‖Qt‖−Γ
q
t )
≥ e−(x+C3)λ2+fλ2(‖Pt‖−Γ
p
t )−gλ2(‖Qt‖−Γ
q
t )
]
. (66)
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Now using the facts that P[X1 ≥ X2,X3 ≥ X4] ≤ P[X1 · X3 ≥ X2 · X4], for non-negative random
variables X41 , and Markov inequality along with (61), we get
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ e
−x,R(2)t ≤ e
x+C3
)
≤ C0 · E1
[
e−λ1x−hλ1Γ
p
t−gλ1Γ
q
t+λ2(x+C3)e−fλ2(‖Pt‖−Γ
p
t )+gλ2(‖Qt‖−Γ
q
t )
]
.
(67)
Using the facts that ‖Qt‖ = ρ · ‖Pt‖ and Γ
q
t = ρ · Γ
p
t , we obtain,
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ e
−x,R(2)t ≤ e
x+C3
)
C0 · E1
[
ex(λ2−λ1)+λ2C3−(fλ2−ρgλ2)‖Pt‖e(fλ2−ρgλ2−hλ1−ρgλ1)Γ
p
t
]
. (68)
By symmetry, we can get the above upper bound with (λ2 − λ1) replaced by (λ1 − λ2). Indeed, to
show this we replace (65) with
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ e
−x,R(2)t ≤ e
x+C3
)
= P1
[(
R
(1)
t
)−(1−λ1)
≥ e(1−λ1)x,
(
R
(2)
t
)−(1−λ2)
≥ e−(1−λ2)(x+C3)
]
,
(69)
and follow the (66)–(67). Therefore, we may write
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ e
−x,R(2)t ≤ e
x+C3
)
≤ C0 · E1
[
e−x|λ2−λ1|+λ2C3−(fλ2−ρgλ2)‖Pt‖e(fλ2−ρgλ2−hλ1−ρgλ1)Γ
p
t
]
.
(70)
We can now optimize our choices of λ1 and λ2 to minimize the above upper bound. We take
λ1 + λ2 = 1. For such a pair it is easy to check that,
fλ2 − ρgλ2 − hλ1 − ρgλ1 =
α− β
α+ β
(1− ρ). (71)
We next consider the case where ρ ≥ 1, for which the r.h.s. of (71) is negative, and so,
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ e
−x,R(2)t ≤ e
x+C3
)
≤ C0 · E1
[
e−x|2λ1−1|+λ2C3−(f1−λ1−ρg1−λ1)‖Pt‖e
α−β
α+β
(1−ρ)Γpt
]
(72)
≤ C0 · e
−x|2λ1−1|+(1−λ1)C3−(f1−λ1−ρg1−λ1)‖Pt‖. (73)
In the interval λ1 ∈ [0, 1], it can be checked that f1−λ1 − ρg1−λ1 is maximized at
λ⋆1 = min

1, log
(
ρ · α/β−1logα/β
)
logα/β

 . (74)
We mention here that λ⋆1 satisfies the following equality(
α
β
)λ⋆1
=
(α− β)ρ
β log αβ
, (75)
which proves to be useful. It can be shown that λ⋆1 ≥ 1/2. Thus, whenever λ
⋆
1 < 1, which happens
to be the case exactly when ρ ≤ ρ1, we have
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ e
−x,R(2)t ≤ e
x+C3
)
≤ C0 · e
−x|2λ⋆1−1|+(1−λ⋆1)C3−(f1−λ⋆1−ρg1−λ⋆1 )‖Pt‖. (76)
18
It can be checked that
f1−λ⋆1 − ρg1−λ⋆1 =
α log αβ − ρ(α− β)
(α+ β) log αβ
− ρ
α− β
α+ β
(1− λ⋆1) (77)
=
α log αβ − ρ(α− β)
(α+ β) log αβ
−
ρ(α− β)
α+ β

1− log
[
ρ(α/β−1)
log α
β
]
log αβ

 (78)
=
α
β log
α
β − ρ(
α
β − 1)
[
1 + log
α
β
log α
β
ρ(α
β
−1)
]
(1 + αβ ) log
α
β
(79)
= δ(α/β, ρ), (80)
where δ(α/β, ρ) is defined (18). Combining the above result with (62), we get
P1
(
Rt ≤
α
β
)
≤ C ′0e
(1−λ⋆1)C3−δ(α/β,ρ)‖Pt‖ +
1
t2
, (81)
where we have used the fact that
∑C1 log t
x=0 e
−x|2λ⋆1−1| is finite, and absorbed its value in the constant
C ′0. Then, substituting the above result in (43) and then in (42), we obtain
Pe,t(P,Q) ≤
[
C ′0e
(1−λ⋆1)C3−δ(γ,ρ)‖Pt‖ +
1
t2
]
· (1− pt) +
β
α+ β
· pt. (82)
Therefore, taking pt =
(1+γ)κ(γ)
t ∧ 1 = p
⋆
t , we obtain that for 1 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ1,
E(P⋆,Q) = lim inf
t→∞ −
logPe,t(P
⋆,Q)
log t
(83)
≥ δ(α/β, ρ) · lim inf
t→∞
‖Pt‖
log t
(84)
= δ(γ, ρ) [(1 + γ)κ(γ)] , (85)
as claimed. Next, we consider the case where ρ < 1. In this case, the the r.h.s. of (71) is positive,
and so,
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ e
−x,R(2)t ≤ e
x+C3
)
≤ C0 · E1
[
e−x|2λ1−1|+λ2C3−(f1−λ1−ρg1−λ1 )‖Pt‖e
α−β
α+β
(1−ρ)Γpt
]
(86)
≤ C0 · e
−x|2λ1−1|+(1−λ1)C3−(f1−λ1−ρg1−λ1 )‖Pt‖ · e
α−β
α+β
(1−ρ)‖Pt‖. (87)
Again, f1−λ1 − ρg1−λ1 is maximized at
λ⋆1 =
log
(
ρ · α/β−1logα/β
)
logα/β
, (88)
and note that for ρ < 1 it is always the case that λ⋆1 < 1. Also, for ρ0 < ρ ≤ 1, we have that
λ⋆1 ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, we may write
P1
(
R
(1)
t ≤ e
−x,R(2)t ≤ e
x+C3
)
≤ C0e
−x|2λ⋆1−1|+(1−λ⋆1)C3−
[
δ(α/β,ρ)−α−β
α+β
(1−ρ)
]
‖Pt‖. (89)
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Combining the above result with (62), we get
P1
(
Rt ≤
α
β
)
≤ C ′0e
(1−λ⋆1)C3−
[
δ(γ,ρ)−α−β
α+β
(1−ρ)
]
‖Pt‖ +
1
t2
. (90)
Then, substituting the above result in (43) and then in (42), we obtain
Pe,t(P,Q) ≤
β
α+ β
· pt +
[
C ′0e
(1−λ⋆1)C3−
[
δ(γ,ρ)−α−β
α+β
(1−ρ)
]
‖Pt‖ +
1
t2
]
· (1− pt). (91)
Therefore, taking pt =
α+β
β
κ(α,β)
t ∧ 1 = p
⋆
t , we obtain that for ρ0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1,
E(P⋆,Q) = lim inf
t→∞ −
logPe,t(P
⋆,Q)
log t
≥
[
δ(γ, ρ) − (1− ρ)
γ − 1
γ + 1
]
· lim inf
t→∞
‖P⋆t ‖
log t
=
[
δ(γ, ρ) − (1− ρ)
γ − 1
γ + 1
]
(1 + γ)κ(γ), (92)
as claimed.
4.2.2 Upper Bound: ρ ≥ ρ1 and ‖Qt‖ ≫ log t
We prove that for ρ ≥ ρ1 we have E(P
⋆,Q) = 0. We show that this is correct also when
lim inft→∞
‖Qt‖
log t =∞ as stated in Theorem 2. To this end, first note that from (8), we have
P
(
MAPQ(Zt−11 ,Xt) 6= θ
)
= P1
(
MAPQ(Zt−11 ,Xt) 6= 1
)
≥ P1
(
R′t < 1
)
≥ P1
(
Rt−1 <
β
α
)
, (93)
and so it is suffice to lower bound the r.h.s. of (93). It is clear that
P1
(
Rt <
β
α
)
≥ P1
(
Ri <
β
α
, ∀i ∈ [t]
)
. (94)
Accordingly, in order to obtain a lower bound on (94) we define three events that together imply that
Rt < β/α. We note that the derivations bellow follow [17, Sec. 2.2], with modifications which handle
the mismatch aspect of our model. We need a few definitions. Let τ(s) , min{t ≥ 1 : ‖Qt‖ ≥ s},
and t0 , τ(2
α−β
α+β log
α
β + 2). Define
E0 ,
{
Rt0 < (β/α)
4
}
. (95)
The above initial event takes the mismatched likelihood ratio below β/α, and the events we define
below ensure that it always stays below this bar. Let Jt , logRt, and define the stopping time
T , min{s ≥ t0 : Js 6∈ [− log t, 2 log(β/α)]}. We define the events
E1 , {JT ≤ − log t} , (96)
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and
E2 ,
{
min
s∈[t]
Js ≥ − log
3/4 t
}
. (97)
We observe that E0 ∩ E1 ∩ E2 imply together that Js ∈
[
− log3/4 t, 2 log βα
]
, for all s ∈ [t0, t], which
in turn implies that Rt < β/α. Thus,
P1
(
Rt ≤
β
α
)
≥ P1 (E0 ∩ E1 ∩ E2) . (98)
We next lower bound the probability of the event E0 which is easier to handle. Note that according
to our setting the first two individuals follow their private signal, and hence if X1 = X2 = 2, we
have Z1 = Z2 = 2. This in turn implies that R2 = (β/α)
2. Now, if Xi = 2 for all i ∈ {3, 4, . . . , t0},
then it is clear that Zi = 2, for all i ∈ {3, 4, . . . , t0} as well. Accordingly, using (25)–(26), this
implies that the mismatched likelihood ratio at time t0 is given by
Rt0 =
(
β
α
)2 t0∏
i=3
1− αα+β qi
1− βα+β qi
(99)
≤
(
β
α
)2
exp
(
−
α− β
α+ β
t0∑
i=3
qi
)
. (100)
However, by the definition of t0, we know that
t0∑
i=3
qi ≥ ‖Qt0‖ − 2 ≥ 2
α + β
α − β
log
α
β
, (101)
which together with (100) implies that Rt0 ≤ (β/α)
4. Thus,
P1 (E0) ≥ P1 (Xi = 2 ∀i ∈ [t0]) =
(
β
α+ β
)t0
. (102)
Therefore, because t0 is a constant it is suffice to lower bound the probability P1(E1∩E2|E0). Given
E0, the log-likelihood ratio Jt performs a random walk from time t0 until the stopping time T .
Specifically, using (25)–(26), and (46), for s ≥ t0, we may write
Js∧T = Jt0 +
s∧T∑
i=t0+1
ξi (103)
where {ξi} are statistically independent random variables such that
P1
(
ξi = log
α
β
)
=
α
α+ β
pi, (104)
and
P1
(
ξi = log
1− αα+β qi
1− βα+β qi
)
= 1−
α
α+ β
pi. (105)
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Now, note that
E1 [ξi] =
α
α+ β
log
α
β
pi −
α− β
α+ β
qi +Θ(q
2
i + p
2
i )
=
ρ+ γ(log γ − ρ)
1 + γ
pi +Θ(p
2
i ) (106)
where γ = α/β. The important observation here is that ρ ≥ ρ1 is equivalent ρ+ γ(log γ − ρ) ≤ 0,
which implies that the log-likelihood ratio has a downward (non-positive) drift. More precisely, it
can be seen that the expectation can be written as E1[ξi] = −η · pi +Θ(p
2
i ), for some η > 0. Since
pi is decaying with i, it is clear that there exists a finite index i0 ∈ N, such that E1[ξi] ≤ 0, for
all i ≥ i0. Accordingly, letting t¯0 , t0 ∨ i0, we obtain that under P1, the random walk {Js∧T }s≥t¯0
is a supermartingale. For simplicity of notation, for the rest of the proof we use t0 in place of t¯0.
Therefore, by the optional stopping theorem we have
E1[JT |E0] ≤ E1[Jt0 ] ≤ 4 log
β
α
. (107)
On the other hand, by the definition of T , it is either the case that JT > 2 log
β
α , in which case
JT ∈ (2 log
β
α , log
β
α ], or JT < − log t, and then JT ∈ [− log t− log
β
α ,− log t). Thus, we can write
E1[JT |E0] = E1
[
JT1
[
JT > 2 log
β
α
]
|E0
]
+ E1 [JT1 [JT < − log t] |E0] (108)
≥ [1− P1(E1|E0)] 2 log
β
α
− P1(E1|E0) ·
(
log t+ log
β
α
)
(109)
≥ 2 log
β
α
− P1(E1|E0) · log t, (110)
which together with (107) implies that
P1(E1|E0) ≥
2 log γ
log t
. (111)
Finally, using classical results on the tails of supermartingales (see, e.g., [11, 10]), we have
P
(
min
s∈[t]
Js < − log
3/4 t
∣∣∣∣ E0
)
≤ e−c
√
log t, (112)
and thus
P1 (E1 ∩ E2|E0) ≥
log γ
log t
, (113)
for t large enough. Combining (27), (93), (98), (102), and (113), we obtain
E(P⋆,Q) = lim inf
t→∞ −
logPe,t(P
⋆,Q)
log t
(114)
≤ lim inf
t→∞ −
logP1 (E1 ∩ E2|E0)
log t
= 0, (115)
which concludes the proof. Finally, using the above arguments we prove that when Q¯ satisfies
lim inft→∞
‖Q¯t‖
log t = ∞, then E(P
⋆, Q¯) = 0, as stated in Theorem 2. Specifically, let Q be any
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sequence of assumed revealing probabilities such that qt = ρ · p
⋆
t , with ρ > ρ1. Let R
Q¯
t and R
Q
t
designate the likelihoods corresponding to the revealing probabilities Q¯ and Q, respectively. Then,
from (94) it is clear that
P
(
MAPQ¯(Z
t
1,Xt+1) 6= θ
)
≥ P1
(
RQ¯t <
β
α
)
(116)
≥ P1
(
RQ¯i <
β
α
, ∀i ∈ [t]
)
. (117)
Now, note that for large enough t it must be the case that q¯t > qt. The log-likelihood ratio J
Q¯
t
performs a random walk with probabilities given in (104)–(105), with qt replaced by q¯t. Accordingly,
it is clear that the random variables {ξi} can take only smaller values under Q¯ compared to Q.
This in turn implies that RQ¯ ≤ RQ, and thus,
P
(
MAPQ¯(Z
t
1,Xt+1) 6= θ
)
≥ P1
(
RQ¯i <
β
α
, ∀i ∈ [t]
)
≥ P1
(
RQi <
β
α
, ∀i ∈ [t]
)
≥ P1(E0 ∩ E1 ∩ E2), (118)
which is the same lower bound we started with for Q.
4.2.3 Upper Bound: 1 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ1
We consider the case where 1 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ1, and continue from (106). Indeed, in this regime, the
expectation in (106) is non-negative and thus the log-likelihood ratio Js has an upward drift. We
remove this drift by defining a new measure P˜1, such that for i > t0,
P˜1
(
ξi = log
α
β
)
= νi, (119)
P˜1
(
ξi = log
1− αα+β qi
1− βα+β qi
)
= 1− νi, (120)
where
νi ,
log
1− β
α+β
qi
1− α
α+β
qi
log
(
α
β
1− β
α+β
qi
1− α
α+β
qi
) . (121)
Now, under P˜1, the random walk {Js∧T }s≥t0 is a martingale, and thus using the same steps we used
in (107)–(113), we obtain that
P˜1 (E1 ∩ E2|E0) ≥
log γ
log t
, (122)
for t large enough. Next, performing a change of measure we may write
P1 (E1 ∩ E2|E0) = E˜1
[
dP1(·|E0)
dP˜1(·|E0)
1 [E1 ∩ E2]
∣∣∣∣ E0
]
, (123)
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so we need to understand how the Radon-Nikodym derivative of P1(·|E0) w.r.t. P˜1(·|E0) behaves.
Note that
dP1(·|E0)
dP˜1(·|E0)
=
t∏
i=t0+1
{
α
α+βp
⋆
i
νi
1
[
ξi = log
α
β
]
+
1− αα+βp
⋆
i
1− νi
1
[
ξi = log
1− αα+β qi
1− βα+β qi
]}
. (124)
We claim that each factor in the product can be lower bounded for some C = C(α, β) as follows
α
α+β p
⋆
i
νi
1
[
ξi = log
α
β
]
+
1− αα+βp
⋆
i
1− νi
1
[
ξi = log
1− αα+β qi
1− βα+β qi
]
≥ e(1−λ
⋆)ξi ·Ki(ξi) (125)
where λ⋆ = λ⋆1 is defined in (74), and
Ki(ξi) , e
−δ(γ,ρ)p⋆i−C(p⋆i )2 · 1
[
ξi = log
1− αα+β qi
1− βα+β qi
]
+ e
−ρ
(
1
2
− α−β
(α+β) log α
β
)
p⋆i−C(p⋆i )2
· 1
[
ξi = log
α
β
]
.
(126)
Indeed, this inequality can be checked for both potential values of ξ by expanding the expressions
in p⋆i . Then, multiplying (125) over all i ∈ {t0 + 1, . . . , t}, using the fact that Jt = Jt0 +
∑t
i=t0+1
ξi
on the event E1 ∩ E2, we obtain that
dP1(·|E0)
dP˜1(·|E0)
1 [E1 ∩ E2] ≥ e
(1−λ⋆)(Jt−Jt0 )−C
∑t
i=1(p
⋆
i )
2
· e
−δ(γ,ρ)∑i∈Vc p⋆i−ρ
(
1
2
− α−β
(α+β) log α
β
)∑
i∈V p
⋆
i
1 [E1 ∩ E2]
≥ e(1−λ
⋆)Jt−C′ · e
−δ(γ,ρ)‖P⋆t ‖−ρ
(
1
2
− α−β
(α+β) log α
β
)∑
i∈V p
⋆
i
1 [E1 ∩ E2] , (127)
where V , {i ≥ t0 : ξi = log(α/β)}, C
′ , C
∑t
i=1(p
⋆
i )
2 is finite, and the second inequality follows
because conditioned on E0 we know that Jt0 < 0. Also, recall that on the event E1 ∩ E2 we have
that Jt ≥ − log
3/4 t, and thus
dP1(·|E0)
dP˜1(·|E0)
1 [E1 ∩ E2] ≥ e
−(1−λ⋆) log3/4 t−C′−δ(γ,ρ)‖P⋆t ‖e
−ρ
(
1
2
− α−β
(α+β) log α
β
)∑
i∈V p
⋆
i
1 [E1 ∩ E2] . (128)
We next show that with high probability |V| is at most logarithmic in t and thus
∑
i∈V p
⋆
i is
negligible compared to other contributions in the exponent of the r.h.s. of (128). Let Z ,∑t
i=t0+1
1
[
ξi = log
α
β
]
. Then, we already saw that under P˜1 the random variables {ξ}i>t0 are
statistically independent. Specifically, Z follows a Poisson-Binomial distribution with success prob-
abilities νi given in (121). Using Chernoff’s inequality, for a Poisson-Binomial random variable Z
with mean µ, and any s > µ, it can be shown that
P [Z ≥ s] ≤ exp
(
s− µ− s log
s
µ
)
. (129)
Accordingly, in our case it is clear that µ =
∑t
i=t0+1
νi = C1(1 + o(1)) · log t, as t → ∞, for some
C1(α, β), due to the fact that νi ∝ qi = Θ(t
−1). Taking s = ℓ · µ, such that (ℓ− 1− ℓ log ℓ) ≤ − 2C1 ,
we obtain from (129) that P˜1 [Z ≥ s] ≤ t
−2. Thus, with probability at least 1 − O(t−2) we have
that |V| ≤ C ′′ log t, for some constant C ′′. This in turn implies that with the same probability∑
i∈V
p⋆i ≤ C2(1 + o(1)) · log(log t) = o(log t). (130)
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Therefore, combining (123), (128), and (130), we obtain
P1 (E1 ∩ E2|E0) = E˜1
[
dP1(·|E0)
dP˜1(·|E0)
1 [E1 ∩ E2]
∣∣∣∣ E0
]
≥ E˜1
[
e−(1−λ
⋆) log3/4 t−C′−δ(γ,ρ)‖P⋆t ‖ · e
−ρ
(
1
2
− α−β
(α+β) log α
β
)∑
i∈V p
⋆
i
1 [E1 ∩ E2]
∣∣∣∣∣ E0
]
≥
[
1−O(t−2)
]
e−o(log t)−δ(γ,ρ)‖P
⋆
t ‖P˜1(E1 ∩ E2|E0)
≥
[
1−O(t−2)
]
log αβ
log t
e−o(log t)−δ(γ,ρ)‖P
⋆
t ‖. (131)
Combining (27), (93), (98), (102), and (131), we obtain
E(P⋆,Q) = lim inf
t→∞ −
logPe,t(P
⋆,Q)
log t
(132)
≤ lim inf
t→∞ −
logP1 (E1 ∩ E2|E0)
log t
(133)
≤ δ(γ, ρ) lim inf
t→∞
‖P⋆t ‖
log t
(134)
= δ(γ, ρ)[(1 + γ)κ(γ)], (135)
as claimed.
4.2.4 Upper Bound: ρ ≤ ρ0
For ρ ≤ ρ0 we use the fact that when the log-likelihood ratio is above log α/β, it has a downward
drift. This implies that above log α/β, the walk cannot go beyond a certain value. Recall (93). As
before, in order to obtain a lower bound on (93) we define an event that implies that Rt < β/α.
Now, when the log-likelihood ratio Jt , logRt is above the line log α/β, using (25)–(26), and (46),
we may write
Js =
s∑
i=1
ξi, (136)
for s ≥ 0, where ξi’s are statistically independent random variables, and
P1
(
ξi = log
β
α
)
=
β
α+ β
pi, (137)
and
P1
(
ξi = log
1− βα+β qi
1− αα+β qi
)
= 1−
β
α+ β
pi. (138)
Note that
E1 [ξi] =
(γ − 1)ρ− log γ
1 + γ
pi +Θ(p
2
i ). (139)
Thus, we see that for ρ ≤ ρ0, we have E1 [ξi] ≤ 0. We next show that with high probability
max1≤i≤t Ji < τ0, namely, the maximal value that the log-likelihood ratio can achieve is bounded
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Figure 3: Illustration of a sample path of the random walk constructed in the lower bound.
by a certain constant τ0. Accordingly, using the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2
this implies that only a finite number of timestamps are needed in order to drive log-likelihood
ratio bellow log α/β. Specifically, as in the proof of Theorem 2 it is suffice to assume that the last
t⋆ + 3 revealers are such that their private information is Xi = 2. Indeed, if for example, at time
ℓ = t−(t⋆+3) the log-likelihood ratio Jℓ attained its maximal possible value τ0 (or e
τ0 for Rℓ). Then,
after t⋆ timestamps, i.e., at time ℓ = t− 3, the likelihood value is at most (β/α)t
⋆
eτ0 . Accordingly,
if we set t⋆ = 1 ∨ ( τ0logα/β − 1), then we get that the likelihood value is (β/α)
t⋆ eτ0 ≤ α/β, namely,
bellow α/β. Thus, in the worst case, at time ℓ = t− 3, the likelihood ratio value is in the interval
[β/α, α/β]. In this interval, the MAP estimator outputs the private signal, namely, Zi = Xi = 2,
and accordingly, the likelihood ratio is multiplied by β/α. Therefore, the remaining 3 timestamps
simply insure that at time t the likelihood ratio value is below β/α, as required. To wit, if the
likelihood value at time t − 3 is α/β, then at time t it value will be (β/α)2 < β/α. Thus, by the
above arguments, it is clear that we can lower bound the error probability as follows
P
(
MAPQ(Zt1,Xt+1) 6= θ
)
≥ P1
(
Rt <
β
α
)
(140)
≥
(
β
α+ β
)3+t⋆
P1
[
max
1≤s≤t
Js ≤ τ0
]
. (141)
We next show that there exists a finite value of τ0 such that the probability term at the r.h.s. of
(141) is lower bounded by 1/2. Thus, since t⋆ is finite, we obtain
E(P⋆,Q) = lim inf
t→∞ −
logPe,t(P
⋆,Q)
log t
(142)
≤ lim inf
t→∞ −
log
[
1
2
(
β
α+β
)3+t⋆]
log t
(143)
= 0, (144)
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as claimed. It is only left to prove that the probability term at the r.h.s. of (141) is lower bounded
by 1/2. To this end, for any λ ≥ 0, we have
E1
[
eλξi
]
=
β
α+ β
eλ log
β
α pi + e
λ log
1−
β
α+β
qi
1− α
α+β
qi
(
1−
β
α+ β
pi
)
=
β
α+ β
[
1 +
(
eλ log
β
α − 1
)]
pi +
[
1 + λρ
α− β
α+ β
pi +Θ(p
2
i )
](
1−
β
α+ β
pi
)
= 1 +
[(
eλ log
β
α − 1
) β
α+ β
+ λρ
α− β
α+ β
]
pi +Θ(p
2
i )
= 1 +
[(
e−λ log γ − 1
) 1
γ + 1
+ λρ
γ − 1
γ + 1
]
pi +Θ(p
2
i ). (145)
Let us define the map,
ϕ : λ 7→
(
e−λ log γ − 1
) 1
γ + 1
+ λρ
γ − 1
γ + 1
. (146)
For λ≪ 1, we have ϕ(λ) = (ρ−ρ0)(γ−1)γ+1 λ+O(λ
2), and since ρ− ρ0 ≤ 0, we may conclude that ϕ(·)
has a negative derivative at 0, hence its minimum, attained at λ0 > 0, is strictly negative, namely,
ϕ(λ0) < 0. Accordingly, due to statistical independence we may write,
E1
[
eλ0Js
]
= Cse
ϕ(λ0)‖P⋆s ‖, (147)
for a certain converging/bounded sequence {Cs}s≥1. Next, define the random process
Ms ,
exp (λ0Js)
E1 [exp (λ0Js)]
, (148)
for s ≥ 1. It is clear that {Ms}s≥1 is a positive martingale. Thus, using Doob’s martingale maximal
inequality, we have for τ > 0,
P1
[
max
1≤s≤t
Ms ≥ τ
]
≤
E1(Mt)
τ
=
1
τ
, (149)
which is equivalent to
P1
[
max
1≤s≤t
eλ0Js
Cseϕ(λ0)‖P
⋆
s ‖
≥ τ
]
≤
1
τ
. (150)
In particular, using the fact that ϕ(λ0) < 0, it is clear that the above implies that
P1
[
max
1≤s≤t
eλ0Js ≥ τ · max
1≤s≤t
Cs
]
≤
1
τ
, (151)
or,
P1
[
max
1≤s≤t
Js ≥
log [τ ·max1≤s≤t Cs]
λ0
]
≤
1
τ
. (152)
The above can be written also as follows
P1
[
max
1≤s≤t
Js ≥ τ
]
≤ e−λ0τ · max
1≤s≤t
Cs. (153)
Therefore, taking τ > τ0 ,
2 logmax1≤s≤t Cs
λ0
, we have P1 [max1≤s≤t Js ≥ τ ] < 1/2, as claimed.
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4.2.5 Upper Bound: ρ0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1
For this regime we use similar arguments as in the previous subsection. The main difference here is
that the log-likelihood ratio random walk now has a positive drift, and thus is unbounded. However,
we claim that this unbounded value is small compared to log t, and thus, the number of timestamps
t⋆ needed to bring the random walk bellow log βα is small compared to log t, and more importantly
will not affect the learning rate. Specifically, recall (141). Taking τ0 = log
3/4 t, we have,
P
(
MAPQ(Zt1,Xt+1) 6= θ
)
≥ P1
(
Rt <
β
α
)
(154)
≥
(
β
α+ β
)3+t⋆
P1
[
max
1≤s≤t
Js ≤ log
3/4 t
]
, (155)
and since t⋆ = Θ(τ0), we have
E(P⋆,Q) = lim inf
t→∞ −
logPe,t(P
⋆,Q)
log t
(156)
≤ lim inf
t→∞ −
logP1
[
max1≤s≤t Js ≤ log3/4 t
]
log t
. (157)
We next upper bound the r.h.s. of the above inequality. To this end, note that above logα/β, the
log-likelihood ratio process Js forms a random walk as in (136)–(138), now with a positive drift
since ρ ≥ ρ0. We remove this drift by defining a new measure P˜1, such that,
P˜1
(
ξi = log
β
α
)
= νi, (158)
P˜1
(
ξi = log
1− βα+β qi
1− αα+β qi
)
= 1− νi, (159)
where
νi ,
log
1− β
α+β
qi
1− α
α+β
qi
log
(
α
β
1− β
α+β
qi
1− α
α+β
qi
) . (160)
Now, under P˜1, the random walk {Js}s is a martingale, and thus, using classical results on the tails
of martingales (see, e.g., [11, 10])
P˜1
(
max
1≤s≤t
Js ≤ log
3/4 t
)
≥ 1− e−c
√
log t, (161)
for t large enough. Next, performing a change of measure we may write
P1
(
max
1≤s≤t
Js ≤ log
3/4 t
)
= E˜1
[
dP1(·)
dP˜1(·)
1
[
max
1≤s≤t
Js ≤ log
3/4 t
]]
, (162)
so we need to understand how the Radon-Nikodym derivative of P1(·) w.r.t. P˜1(·) behaves. Note
that
dP1(·)
dP˜1(·)
=
t∏
i=1
{
β
α+βp
⋆
i
νi
1
[
ξi = log
β
α
]
+
1− βα+β p
⋆
i
1− νi
1
[
ξi = log
1− βα+β qi
1− αα+β qi
]}
. (163)
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We claim that each factor in the product can be lower bounded for some C = C(α, β) as follows
β
α+βp
⋆
i
νi
1
[
ξi = log
β
α
]
+
1− βα+βp
⋆
i
1− νi
1
[
ξi = log
1− βα+β qi
1− αα+β qi
]
≥ eλ
⋆ξiK˜i(ξi), (164)
where λ⋆ = λ⋆1 is defined in (74), and
K˜i(ξi) , e
−
[
δ(γ,ρ)− γ−1
γ+1
(1−ρ)
]
p⋆i−C(p⋆i )2 · 1
[
ξi = log
1− βα+β qi
1− αα+β qi
]
+ e
−ρ
(
1
2
− α−β
(α+β) log α
β
)
p⋆i−C(p⋆i )2
· 1
[
ξi = log
β
α
]
. (165)
Indeed, this inequality can be checked for both potential values of ξ by expanding the expressions
in p⋆i . Then, multiplying (164) over all i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, we obtain that
dP1(·)
dP˜1(·)
≥ eλ
⋆Jt−C
∑t
i=1(p
⋆
i )
2
e
−
[
δ(γ,ρ)− γ−1
γ+1
(1−ρ)
]∑
i∈Vc p
⋆
i e
−ρ
(
1
2
− α−β
(α+β) log α
β
)∑
i∈V p
⋆
i
≥ eλ
⋆Jt−C′e−
[
δ(γ,ρ)− γ−1
γ+1
(1−ρ)
]
‖P⋆t ‖e
−ρ
(
1
2
− α−β
(α+β) log α
β
)∑
i∈V p
⋆
i
≥ eλ
⋆ log α
β
−C′e−
[
δ(γ,ρ)− γ−1
γ+1
(1−ρ)
]
‖P⋆t ‖e
−ρ
(
1
2
− α−β
(α+β) log α
β
)∑
i∈V p
⋆
i
, (166)
where V , {i ≥ 1 : ξi = log(β/α)}, C
′ , C
∑t
i=1(p
⋆
i )
2 is finite. As in (129)–(130), with probability
at least 1 − O(t−2), we have
∑
i∈V p
⋆
i = o(log t). Therefore, combining this fact with (161), (162),
and (166), we obtain
P1
(
max
1≤s≤t
Js ≤ log
3/4 t
)
= E˜1
[
dP1(·)
dP˜1(·)
1
[
max
1≤s≤t
Js ≤ log
3/4 t
]]
≥ E˜1
[
e
λ⋆ log α
β
−C′
e
−
[
δ(γ,ρ)− γ−1
γ+1
(1−ρ)
]
‖P⋆t ‖
·e
−ρ
(
1
2
− α−β
(α+β) log α
β
)∑
i∈V p
⋆
i
1
[
max
1≤s≤t
Js ≤ log
3/4 t
]]
≥ [1−O(t−2)]e−o(log t)−
[
δ(γ,ρ)− γ−1
γ+1
(1−ρ)
]
‖P⋆t ‖
P˜1
[
max
1≤s≤t
Js ≤ log
3/4 t
]
≥ [1−O(t−2)](1 − e−c
√
log t)e
−o(log t)−
[
δ(γ,ρ)− γ−1
γ+1
(1−ρ)
]
‖P⋆t ‖. (167)
Finally, substituting (167) in (157), we finally obtain
E(P⋆,Q) = lim inf
t→∞ −
log Pe,t(P
⋆,Q)
log t
≤ lim inf
t→∞ −
log P1
[
max1≤s≤t Js ≤ log3/4 t
]
log t
≤
[
δ(γ, ρ) −
γ − 1
γ + 1
(1− ρ)
]
lim inf
t→∞
‖P⋆t ‖
log t
=
[
δ(γ, ρ) −
γ − 1
γ + 1
(1− ρ)
]
(1 + γ)κ(γ), (168)
as claimed.
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4.3 Additional Proofs
4.3.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Note that the first two individuals follow their private signal, that is, Zi = Xi, for i = 1, 2.
Therefore, if if X1 = X2 = 2, then it is clear that R2 = (β/α)
2, which implies that the MAP
estimator outputs 2 as its decision. Accordingly, it should be clear that if all future irrational
players draw 2 as their private information, then the MAP estimator continues to output 2. The
above scenario gives a lower bound on the error probability. Specifically, let Revt denote the set
of revealers up to time t. It is clear that |Revt| follows a Poisson-Binomial distribution with mean
µ = ‖Pt‖ = o(log t). Thus, for any c > 1, using (129) we get
P [|Revt| ≥ c ‖Pt‖] ≤ e
−(c log c−c+1)‖Pt‖. (169)
Taking any c such that c log c− c+ 1 > 0, it is clear that the r.h.s. of (169) is less than half, and
P
(
MAPQ(Zt1,Xt+1) 6= θ
)
≥ P1(X1 = 2,X2 = 2,Xi = 2,∀i ∈ Revt)
≥
1
2
(
β
α+ β
)2
P1

 ⋂
i∈Revt
{Xi = 2}
∣∣∣∣∣∣ |Revt| ≤ c ‖Pt‖


≥
1
2
(
β
α+ β
)2+c‖Pt‖
. (170)
Thus,
E(P,Q) = lim inf
t→∞ −
logP
(
MAPQ(Zt1,Xt+1) 6= θ
)
log t
≤ [c log(1 + γ)] · lim inf
t→∞
‖Pt‖
log t
= 0, (171)
as claimed.
4.3.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Since the proof of Theorem 5 follows the steps of the proof of Theorem 3 almost exactly, in this
subsection we highlight the few technical differences only. Starting with the lower bounds, using
the same steps as in Subsection 4.2.1, one obtains the same upper bounds on the error probability
as in (82) and (91), for 1 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ1 and ρ0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, respectively. In particular, for 1 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ1 recall
that
Pe,t(P,Q) ≤
[
C ′0e
(1−λ⋆1)C3−δ(γ,ρ)‖Pt‖ +
1
t2
]
· (1− pt) +
β
α+ β
· pt. (172)
Therefore, we get
E(P,Q) = lim inf
t→∞ −
log Pe,t(P
⋆,Q)
log t
(173)
≥ 1 ∧
[
δ(α/β, ρ) · lim inf
t→∞
‖Pt‖
log t
]
(174)
= 1 ∧ [Cp · δ(γ, ρ)] , (175)
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as claimed. Similarly, using (91), we get that
E(P,Q) ≥ 1 ∧
[
Cp ·
(
δ(γ, ρ) −
γ − 1
γ + 1
(1− ρ)
)]
, (176)
for ρ0 ≤ ρ1, as stated in Theorem 5.
The upper bounds in Subsections 4.2.2–4.2.5 remain the same as well. In fact, the only differ-
ences are in Subsections 4.2.3 and 4.2.5. Specifically, for 1 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ1 the lower bound in (131) still
holds true. Then, recall that
Pe,t(P,Q) = P
(
MAPQ(Zt−11 ,Xt) 6= θ
)
· (1− pt) + P(Xt 6= θ) · pt
≥ P (E0 ∩ E1 ∩ E2) · (1− pt) +
β
α+ β
pt, (177)
and thus combined with (131), we obtain
E(P,Q) = lim inf
t→∞ −
logPe,t(P,Q)
log t
(178)
≤ 1 ∧ lim inf
t→∞ −
log P1 (E1 ∩ E2|E0)
log t
(179)
≤ 1 ∧
[
δ(γ, ρ) · lim inf
t→∞
‖P⋆t ‖
log t
]
(180)
= 1 ∧ [Cp · δ(γ, ρ)] , (181)
as claimed. For ρ0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 we have a similar situation. Specifically, the lower bound in (167) still
hold true with P⋆ replaced by P. Also, recalling (155) we have
Pe,t(P,Q) = P
(
MAPQ(Zt−11 ,Xt) 6= θ
)
· (1− pt) + P(Xt 6= θ) · pt
≥
(
β
α+ β
)3+t⋆
P1
[
max
1≤s≤t
Js ≤ log
3/4 t
]
· (1− pt) +
β
α+ β
pt. (182)
Thus, combining (167) and (182), we obtain
E(P,Q) = lim inf
t→∞ −
log Pe,t(P,Q)
log t
≤ 1 ∧
[
Cp ·
(
δ(γ, ρ) −
γ − 1
γ + 1
(1− ρ)
)]
,
as stated in Theorem 5.
4.3.3 Proof of Theorem 6
The proof of Theorem 6 follows from two facts. First, recall that a trivial lower bound on the
error probability is Pe,t(P,Q) ≥
β
α+βpt, which implies that E(P,Q) ≤ − limt→∞ log pt/ log t. We
next show that if Q is such that ‖Qt‖ / ‖Pt‖ → ρ, and ρ0 < ρ < ρ1, then the above also lower
bounds the learning rate. Indeed, as before, using the same steps as in Section 4.2.1, we get the
upper bounds in (82) and (91), for 1 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ1 and ρ0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, respectively. However, since
in this case ‖Pt‖ = ω(log t) the terms in the squared brackets at the r.h.s. of (82) and (91) are
negligible compared to the other βα+βpt. This implies that (82) and (91) are dominated by
β
α+β pt
and thus E(P,Q) ≥ − limt→∞ log pt/ log t, as well. Finally, it is left to show that E(P,Q) = 0 in
the leftover cases, which follows from the same arguments as in Appendices 4.2.2 and 4.2.4, and
therefore omitted.
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4.4 Adversarial Model is Too Stringent
In this section we show that the error probability in (1) associated with any estimator is lower
bounded by a constant, and accordingly, the total number of errors in (3) is proportional to the
number of players N.
To this end, consider the set of revealers ΠN = [N − VN + 1 : N] in (3). This choice of ΠN
corresponds to the case where all revealers appear at the end. Assume that VN = o(N), otherwise,
TE(VN) is trivially proportional to Θ(N). Then, since all first N− VN players are rational, with a
positive probability a wrong cascade will occur. Indeed, this is just the classical herding experiment,
proposed and studied in [3, 2] (see also [9, Ch. 16]). In fact, each player t ∈ [N−VN] is wrong with
probability at least β
2
(α+β)2
= (1 + γ)−2, which is the probability that the decisions of the first two
players are wrong (both draw marbles of minority type). Therefore, the number of errors in (3)
satisfies
TE(VN) = inf
θˆ∈Θˆ
sup
ΠN⊂[N]: |ΠN|=VN
N∑
t=1
Pe,t(θˆt,ΠN)
≥
N− VN
(1 + γ)2
,
namely, of order Θ(N− VN), which concludes the proof.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper we have studied the effect of mismatch between players on information cascade,
contrary to related works where full/partial mismatch was taken for granted. For the mismatch
model considered in this paper we have identified when learning is possible and when it is not.
Consequently, we demonstrated that the learning rate exhibits several surprising phase transitions.
We hope our work has opened more doors than it closes. There are many questions for future work:
1. It would be interesting to generalize our results to the case where more than two states are
possible, each corresponding to multiple private signals.
2. In this paper we focus on . Studying the asymptotic learning rate and the total number of
wrong errors of information cascades over random graphs (e.g., Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph,
stochastic block models, etc.) is very interesting and of practical importance.
3. Following our negative result on the worst-case model, studying minimax learning rates in
adversarial models, by assuming a more structured geometry for the set of revealers in order
to avoid trivial rates is quite challenging and interesting.
4. It is important to check whether rational players that do not know P can do better then just
assuming some Q. In particular, devising a universal scheme that attains (or at least does not
lose too much) the optimal learning rate for P, without knowing P, is an important question.
A reasonable approach would be using the same qt = Θ(t
−1), and adapt the leading constant
in some way.
5. As discussed in the introduction, it is well-documented in social learning literature that a
fully rational model often places unreasonable computational demands on Bayesian players
(e.g., [16]), hence understanding the impact of simpler more efficient strategies is desirable.
This situation can be partially captured by our model, since a sub-optimal mismatched MAP,
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e.g., a majority rule, can be employed by the players intentionally to reduce computational
complexity. There are of course other computationally efficient strategies that cannot be
covered by our mismatch MAP framework, but we hope that the results and techniques
developed in our paper will prove useful in the analysis of other these strategies as well.
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